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Old Albany Estates, Ltd. v. Highland Carpet Co.:
A Written Confirmation Under U.C.C. Section 2-207
I. FACTS
In Old Albany Estates, Ltd. v. Highland Carpet Co.' the Oklahoma
Supreme Court held that the disclaimer of the warranties of merchantabili-
ty and fitness contained in a written confirmation of an oral agreement did
not constitute a material alteration of a contract between merchants under
section 2-207(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code.2
The dispute surrounded the sale of carpeting by a manufacturer to a
subcontractor for installation in an apartment complex. At the time the
oral agreement was made there was no mention of the warranty disclaimer.
The buyer first became aware of the seller's disclaimer after reading the
seller's invoices, which were "sent with each order,' 3 but arrived prior
to the delivery of the carpet. The buyer did not, however, receive the
invoices containing the disclaimer until after he had paid for the first
shipment. The buyer never objected to the additional terms.
II. BACKGROUND
Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides an
alternative to the common law "mirror image" rule for offer and
acceptance.4 In addition, it provides for the treatment of "additional" and
"different" terms found in written confirmations of oral agreements.5 In a
case concerning a written confirmation of an oral agreement, no inquiry is
made to determine whether the confirmation will act as an acceptance
1. 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 114, 49 OKLA. B.A.J. 759 (Okla. 1978). At this writing a petition for
rehearing is outstanding in the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
2. 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 117,49 OKLA. B.AJ. at761. The Oklahomastatute, which is identical
to U.C.C. § 2-207, is OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-207 (West 1963).
3. 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 115, 49 OKLA. B.AJ. at 760.
4. See R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 37 (1970); Barron & Dunfee, Two
Decades of 2-207: Review, Reflection and Revision, 24 CLEv. ST. L RE,. 171 (1975). Section 2-207provides: (1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation
which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms
additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly
made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract.
Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;,
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a reason-
able time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence ofacontractissufiicientto
establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a
contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on which the
writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated underany
other provisions of this Act.
5. U.C.C. § 2-207, comment 1.
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under subsection (1) of section 2-207; the offer and acceptance phase will
have already been completed. Rather the focus of the inquiry is on the
identification of the terms of the contract under subsections (2) and (3) of
section 2-207. 7 Written confirmations may come from the offeror, the
offeree, or both. It has been suggested that whether the additional terms
contained in a written confirmation come from the offeror or the offeree,
their treatment under section 2-207 should be the same.8
Under section 2-207(2), "additional terms 9 are to be construed as
proposals for addition to the contract."10 If the offeror expressly limits
acceptance to the terms of the offer, no additional terms, material or
immaterial, will become part of the contract.'1 In the absence of an express
limitation the analysis shifts to the issue of materiality. If the additional
terms "materially alter" the contract they will not become part of the
contract whether or not the recipient of the confirmation objects to them.12
If, however, the additional terms are immaterial they will be included as
part of the contract between merchants unless objection is made within a
reasonable time by the recipient of the confirmation.' 3
Subsection (3) is used primarily when the parties have performed
without forming a contract under subsection (1) of section 2-207."4
Subsection (3) may also apply, however, when the parties exchange
conflicting written confirmations. 5 In Old Albany Estates, which
presented only a single confirmation, the court construed the disclaimer as
an additional term under subsection (2) of section 2-207. Attention should
thus be focused on the proper interpretation of subsection (2).
If the offeror does not expressly limit the acceptance to the terms of
the offer, under section 2-207(2)(a) the recipient of the confirmation must
object to any undesired additional terms only if these terms do not
"materially alter" the contract. 16 The Code does not define materiality but
6. See American Parts Co. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 8 Mich. App. 156, 154 N.W.2d 5
(1967); R. DUSENBERG & L. KING, 3 U.C.C. SERVICE § 3.08 at 3-90 (Bender's 1978); Barron & Dunfec,
supra note 4, at 185-86.
7. DUSENBERG & KING, supra note 6, § 3.08.
8. Barron & Dunfee, supra note 4, at 185-86.
9. Subsection I of 2-207 refers to additional or different terms while subsection 2 refers only to
"additional terms." Courts and commentators are split with regard to whethersubsection 2 also applies
to "different" terms. Since the court held the terms in Old Albany Estates to be "additional" terms, an
examination of the conflict over the application of 2-207(2) to "different" terms will not be undertaken.
See Steiner v. Mobil Oil Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 90, 102 n.5, 569 P.2d 751, 759 n.5 (1977).
10. U.C.C. § 2-207(2).
11. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(a).
12. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b); See, e.g., Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161(6th Cir.
1972); Steiner v. Mobil Oil Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 90, 101-02, 569 P.2d 751,759 (1977); American Parts Co.
v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 8 Mich. App. 156, 154 N.W.2d 5 (1967); Air Prods. & Chems. Inc. v,
Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973); U.C.C. § 2-207, comment 3;
DUSENBERG & KING, supra note 6, § 3.08, at 3-90; Corman, The Law of Sales Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 14, 24 (1962).
13. U.C.C. § 2-207(c). See, e.g., DUSENBERG & KING, supra note 6, § 3.03 [1], at 3-30,
14. See, e.g., Barron & Dunfee, supra note 4, at 194.
15. DUSENBERG & KING, supra note 6, § 3.08, at 3-91.
16. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
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the drafters, in the Official Comments, noted that surprise and hardship
resulting from the incorporation of additional terms are to be avoided, and
suggested several examples of both material and immaterial terms.
17
Official Comment 4 to section 2-207 specifically provides:
Examples of typical clauses which would normally 'materially alter' the
contract and so result in surprise or hardship if incorporated without express
awareness by the other party are: a clause negating such standard warranties
as that of merchantability or fitness for a particular Vurpose in circumstances
in which either warranty normally attaches ....
Some commentators are displeased with what they interpret to be a
rigid list of examples contained in the Official Comments. These
commentators argue that the specific examples of materiality and
immateriality found in the Official Comments may not evince the same
degree of surprise and hardship in all business settings. They urge a more
flexible approach to materiality:
Factors such as the amount involved in a transaction, both in dollars and in
quantity, the posture of the parties to each other, the nature of the
marketplace, custom and usage, intention, and conduct in reliance on a
variance are all relevant to determining materiality, and a serious question
may be raised as to the propriety of the invacuo examples of the comments as
guideposts' 9
In a number of cases the issue whether a "proposed" additional term
"materially alters" a contract has been confused with the requirements of
the statute of frauds provision, section 2-201.20 Many of these cases have
arisen in the lower courts in New York21 and deal with the inclusion of
arbitration clauses in written confirmation in the textile industry. Section
2-201 provides that, between merchants, a recipient of a written con-
firmation must object to the confirmation within ten days or lose any
defense based on the statue of frauds.22 The courts in these cases, reading
sections 2-201 and 2-207 together, have ruled that these sections require a
merchant recipient to object to a written confirmation within ten days orbe
bound by the terms of the confirmation. This is clearly a misinterpretation
of both sections. Section 2-201 addresses the issue of the availability of a
statute of frauds defense. It cannot be used to determine the terms of the
17. U.C.C. § 2-207, comments 4 & 5.
18. U.C.C. § 2-207, comment 4.
19. DUSENBERG & KING,supra note 6, § 3.03 [ 1], at 3-28 to -29; Barron & Dunfeesupra note 4, at
193 (quoting DUSENBERG & KING).
20. Loudon Mfg., Inc. v. American & Efird Mills, Inc., 46 App. Div. 2d 637,360 N.Y.S.2d 250
(1974); Trafalgar Square, Ltd. v. Reeves Bros., 35 App. Div. 2d 194,315 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1970); In re
Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 33 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
21. Id. See also Campanelliv. Conservas Altamira, S.A., 86 Nev. 838,477 P.2d 870 (1970) (a case
evidencing similar confusion).
22. U.C.C. § 2-201(2) provides:
Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the contract and
sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has reason to know its
contents, it satisfies the requirements [of a writing] of subsection(l) against such party unless
written notice of objection to its contents is given within 10 days after it is received.
1979]
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contract.23 Additional terms that "materially alter" the contract need not
be objected to under .2-207(2).24
In general, courts have taken three different approaches to the
problem of additional terms in written confirmations. Many courts have
properly focused on the materiality of an additional term to determine
whether inclusion of that term in a contract was appropriate. 25 Other
courts have improperly relied on the statute of frauds provision, section 2-
201, and have concluded that failure of the recipient of a confirmation to
object binds the recipient to any additional terms.26 At least one court has
required an objection by a recipient without discussing the requirement in
the context of materiality or the statute of frauds.27
III. ANALYSIS
In Old Albany Estates, the Oklahoma Supreme Court regarded the
seller's warranty disclaimer as an additional term. The primary issue for
the court was whether the warranty disclaimer materially altered the
contract between the buyer and the seller since acceptance was not limited
to the terms of the offer .28 After quoting the segment of Official Comment 4
of section 2-207 that lists the disclaimer of warranties of merchantability
and fitness as examples of material alterations, 29 the court made the
following determination:
Although the disclaimer in the invoices negated both the warranty of
merchantability and fitness, and would normally be construed to "materially
alter" the contract, such is not the case, under the facts before us, as [the
buyer] was unquestionably aware of the disclaimer--his testimony, as
mentioned above, clearly demonstrated that he had read the disclaimersprior
to receiving thefirst shipment. The record also clearly demonstrates that no
objection to the additional terms was ever made by [the -buyer].3"
The Oklahoma Supreme Court failed to explain adequately why the
disclaimer in Old Albany Estates was not given its "normal construc-
23. C. Itol & Co. v. JordonInt'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228(7th Cir. 1977); JohnThallon & Co. v. M &N
Meat Co., 396 F. Supp. 1239 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp,, 25 Cal,
App. 3d 987, 101 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1972); McCubbin Seed Farm, Inc. v. Tri-Mor Sales, Inc., 257 N.W.2d
55 (Iowa 1977); DUSENBERG & KING, supra note 6, at § 3.08[1], at 3-97 to -99; U.C.C. § 2-201, comment
3: "The only effect, however, is to take away from the party who fails to answer the defense of the
Statute of Frauds." See also note 12 supra.
Recently the New York Court of Appeals helped to clear away some of the confusion in this area,
In Marlene Indus. Corp. v. Carnac Textiles, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 327, 408 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1978), the court
held that an arbitration provision found in a written confirmation was a material alteration and that
section 2-201 was useless in construing the terms of a contract.
24. See note 12 supra.
25. See, e.g., cases cited at note 12 supra.
26. See notes 20-21 supra.
27. Ohio Grain Co. v. Swisshelm, 40 Ohio App. 2d 203, 318 N.E.2d 428 (1973),
28. 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 117, 49 OKLA. B.A.J. at 761. See generally U.C.C. § 2-207 (2)(a),
quoted at note 4 supra.
29. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
30. 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 117, OKLA. B.A.J. at 761 (emphasis in original).
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tion,,31 that is, why the disclaimer was not regarded as a material alteration
of the contract. As an example of additional material terms the drafters of
the Code clearly noted the disclaimer of warranties of merchantability and
fitness. 32 Indeed, courts and commentators considering the materiality of
clauses disclaiming these standard warranties or other limitations on
liability have generally concluded that such clauses represent material
alterations. 33 Even commentators urging a more "flexible" approach34 to
materiality recognize that in the ordinary case, disclaimers of standard
warranties and limitations on liability must be regarded as material
alterations.3 5 The court might have regarded Old Albany Estates as an
unusual case if, for example, disclaimers had been established as a
standard practice through course of dealing or usage of trade.36 There is no
indication in the court's opinion, however, that course of dealing or usage
of trade were issues in this case.
If the primary justification for the court's holdingis that the buyer was
aware of the disclaimer "prior to receiving the first shipment," the result is
unsatisfactory under section 2-207(2). The policy of section 2-207 as
expressed in the Official Comments is to protect the parties from
unreasonable surprise and hardship caused by the imposition of additional
material terms.37 In Old Albany Estates the buyer did not learn of the
disclaimer until after he had paid for the first shipment, when performance
of the contract was well under way. Holding the buyer to the warranty
disclaimer because of knowledge gained after performance had begun
31. 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 117, 49 OKLA. B.A.J. at 761 (quoted in text accompanying note 30
supra).
32. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
33. Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962) (standard warranties);
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Flexible Tubing Corp., 270 F. Supp. 548 (D. Conn. 1967) (pre-Code case in
dictum recognized the materiality of a disclaimer of standard warranties under the Code); Earl M.
Jorgensen Co. v. Mark Constr., Inc., 56 Haw. 466,540 P.2d 978 (1975) (limitation of liability was "an
essential part of [seller's] offer." Id. at469, 540 P.2d at 981.); Furtado v. Woburn Mach. Co., 19 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 760 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1976) (standard warranties); Air Prods. & Chem. Inc. v. Fairbanks
Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193,206 N.W.2d 414 (1973) (limitation on liability is a material alteration); R.
NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW OF SALES § 37, at 99 (1970); J. Wiirm & R. Summteas, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-2, at 29 (1972); DusENaRG & KING,supra
note 6, § 3.03[l], at 3-26. But see J.A. Maurer, Inc. v. Singer Co., 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 110 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1970) (holding a clause limiting liability for consequential damages was not a material alteration)
(result criticized by DUSENBERG & KING, supra note 6, § 3.03 [l], at 3-26).
34. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
35. See DUSENBERG & KING, supra note 6, § 3.03 [1], at 3-26; Weeks, "Battle of the Forms"
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 52 ILL. BJ. 660, 670 (1964).
36. There appear to be two different theories regarding the appropriate treatment of additional
terms reflective of course of dealing or usage of trade. Some commentators would treat additional
terms that reflect course of dealing or usage of trade as immaterial alterations ofa contract. See Weeks,
supra note 35, at 670; Comment, Nonconforming Acceptances Under Section 2-207 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: An End to the Battle of the Forms, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 540,551 n.60 (1963). Other
commentators maintain that such terms found in the confirmation serve to explain the original oral
contract between the parties and do not therefore add to the contract. DusENamG & KING,Supranote
6, § 3.03 [1], at 3-25.
37. See, e.g., Steiner v. Mobil Oil Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 90, 101-02, 569 P.2d 751, 759 (1977);
American Parts Co. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 8 Mich. App. 156,172-73, 154N.W.2d 5,14(1967);
U.C.C. § 2-207, comments 3 & 4.
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subjected the buyer to the type of unreasonable surprise and hardship that
the Code expressly seeks to avoid.
The court may not have given sufficient weight to the issue of mate-
riality and instead focused on the failure of the buyer to object to the
disclaimer. Such a determination reflects confusion over the mechanics
of the statute. Materiality must be determined by the criteria of unrea-
sonable surprise and hardship,3" that is, whether additional terms signifi-
cantly add to or subtract from the contract. The failure of the recipient
of the confirmation to object becomes an issue only when the additional
term is immaterial.39
In sum, the Code seeks to protect businessmen from the effects of
material terms that are forced upon them. In OldAlbany Estates, the seller
did not mention the disclaimer of warranties at the time the oral agreement
was made. There is no indication from the court's opinion that the
disclaimer reflected a course of dealing or usage of trade. Although the
buyer did learn of the disclaimer before delivery of the carpet, he had
already paid for the first shipment. It would there-fore appear that the
buyer was subjected to the type of unreasonable surprise and hardship that
the Code seeks to prevent.
Theodore Samuel Bloom
38. See note 37 and text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.
39. See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra.
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